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8.1  Introduction 
In 1983-84 the world economy recovered from the longest and deep- 
est recession in the postwar period. One notable consequence of the 
recession was that world trade rose only 1.5% in 1980, had no growth 
in  1981, and declined by 2% in 1982 (GATT 1983). Thus trade, rather 
than  being the handmaiden of  growth, has  been  the transmitter of 
stagnation and recession. 
Critics of an open trading regime might try to find lessons from this 
experience in an attempt to promote a protectionist point of view. They 
will be disappointed. International trade during this period made the 
recession less burdensome than it would have been with a less liberal 
regime in place. This is seen most clearly by concentrating on manu- 
factured goods alone. In 1980 world production of manufactured goods 
increased  1.5% but  exports of  manufactures  increased  5%;  in  1981 
manufacturing production increased only 0.5%, but its trade increased 
3.5%; and in  1982  manufacturing  production decreased 2%  percent, 
but its trade declined only 1.5%. Thus, the presumption is established 
that international specialization continued to make headway and that 
efficiency was gained even during the recession. Looking at the difficult 
decade from  1973 to 1982, when aggregate growth and productivity 
declined  in  all industrial countries, production  of  manufactures  in- 
creased at an annual rate of 2.5%,  and trade of manufactures grew at 
the larger annual rate of  4.5%.  In trade in manufactures,  the hand- 
maiden still lives. 
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From 1973 to 1982, the value of  world trade grew at an annual rate 
of  13 2% (reflecting a great deal of inflation). The value of world exports 
of  manufactures grew at a slightly lower rate of 13.0% (the lower rate 
entirely the result of the slower rise of prices). In table 8.1 the trade 
of  manufactured goods is broken down into major subdivisions, and 
the growth rates between 1973 and 1982 are shown. Export growth of 
office and telecommunications equipment was particularly fast (15.7%), 
along with chemicals (14.6%). On the other hand, exports of textiles 
grew only 9.2%, and iron and steel, 10.3%. 
During this same period, total exports from the developing countries 
(excluding traditional oil exporters) grew at a 15.8% annual rate, and 
their manufactures exports at a 18.6% annual rate. Thus, in 1973, only 
Table 8.1  Exports by Commodity Groups 
Compound  Share of  Exports 
Annual World  from LDCs" (%) 
Growth Rate, 
Commodity Group  1973-82  (%)  1973  1981 
Food  10.28  25.52  26.20 
Raw materials  6.79  22.22  20.09 
Ores and minerals  9.59  27.63  3 1.37 
Fuels  23.45  9.42  13.70 
Nonferrous metals  7.81  25.46  16.90 
Total primary products  15.04  20.42  18.50 







10.34  13.18  6.91 
14.62  4.37  6.96 
11.64  11.71  13.31 
13.47  3.14  6.40 
12.21  1.54  3.25 
15.71  7.44  15.01 
telecommunications equipment 
Road motor vehicles  13.18  0.93  1.95 
Other machinery and  14.02  2.90  6.40 
Household appliances  13.19  10.75  17.94 
Textiles  9.19  17.35  23.05 
Clothing  14.08  30.34  40.68 






6.66  10.14 
11.89  13.70 
Source: GATT 1983. 
"Excluding traditional oil exporters, defined as members of OPEC: Algeria, Ecuador, 
Gabon, Indonesia,  Iraq, Islamic Republic of Iran, Kuwait, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 
Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela. 207  Manufactured  Goods in the East and Southeast Asian Region 
6.7% of world exports of manufactures originated  in  less-developed 
countries (LDCs), but by 1982, 10.2% was coming from LDCs (10.1% 
in 1981). In other words, the penetration ratio of LDCs in world markets 
of manufactures had increased by half. The LDC share was greatest 
for traditional labor-intensive products, and by 1981 LDCs were pro- 
viding 40.7% of world exports of clothing, 23.1% of textiles, and 18.6% 
of other consumer goods. For each of these categories the LDC share 
had risen since 1973. However, the rate of growth of LDC penetration 
was greater for many other categories, including all subgroups of en- 
gineering products. Of  course, some of these products were only as- 
sembled  in  LDCs and, therefore, represent a continuation of labor- 
intensive specialization. However, a pattern has been noted in several 
studies that foreign-owned assembly operations over time evolve into 
more local production of parts and thus create a great deal more do- 
mestic value added (Galenson 1985). 
The only category of manufactured exports where the LDC share 
was reduced was in iron and steel, which declined from 13.2% to 6.9%. 
These capital- and skill-intensive products are still mainly the preserve 
of industrial countries. However, certain advanced developing coun- 
tries such as Korea, Taiwan, and Brazil have already established in- 
ternational competitiveness in steel and probably strengthened  their 
position  in  recent  years through major new investments. Therefore, 
the declining LDC share may be due not to a lack of competitiveness 
but rather to either shortage of capacity or growing protectionism (Jones 
1983). Protectionism probably also played a role in limiting the rise in 
the LDC share of textiles, clothing, and footwear. 
8.2  East and Southeast Asian Countries as Exporters 
The developing countries of East and Southeast Asia reflect, indeed 
exaggerate, world trends. As seen in table 8.2, the growth of exports 
of every country in the region from 1973 to 1982 was greater than world 
totals, Indonesia and Korea stand out among these countries as having 
the largest growth in their value of exports: Indonesia primarily because 
of the rise of oil prices and Korea because of increases in manufactured 
exports. All of  the others had approximately the same rate of export 
success. The recession years of  1979-82  saw great differentiation among 
the countries; however, all the countries in this region outperformed 
the world as a whole in export growth. 
What can explain the relative export success of these countries? One 
factor is  the Pacific  Basin  region  itself.  For over two decades,  the 
countries of this region have been the fastest growing countries in the 
world. While the 1979-82 recession has had a negative impact on them, 
they have nevertheless been able to sustain moderate growth rates. 208  Lawrence B. Krause 
Table 8.2  Exports of Asian NICs and ASEAN Countries 
Compound Growth Rate  Share of  Share of 
of Exports (%)  Manufactures  Textiles and Clothing 
in Exports,  in Exports, 







































Sources: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics (Washington, 
D.C.);  Ministry of Finance, Republic  of China, Monthly Statistics of Exports and Im- 
ports, 20  August  1983; World Bank, World Development Report I983 (London: Oxford 
University Press). 
Furthermore, compared with other developing countries in other re- 
gions, the LDCs in East and Southeast Asia have introduced more 
outward-oriented policies.  Singapore and Hong Kong, are at the ex- 
treme of completely free trade.  Since the early  1960s in Taiwan and 
the  mid-1960s in  Korea, these two countries have been  liberalizing 
imports as an ingredient of their export-led growth strategy. The natural- 
resource-exporting countries of the Association of South East Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) have some protection for manufactures, ranging from 
moderate in Malaysia to fairly restrictive in Indonesia. However, in 
every case, the protection is less than that of other LDCs with similar 
economic structures and at similar stages of development. The impor- 
tant point is that none of these countries envision their development 
within  a  context  of  self-sufficiency  but  rather  have  an  outward 
orientation. 
A third factor that helps explain the export success of these countries 
is the pattern of trade within the Pacific Basin. All of these countries 
sell more than half their exports to other countries within the Pacific 
Basin, and on average more than 60% (table 8.3). There are two distinct 
patterns of trade involved. There are the newly industrializing countries 
(NICs) that specialize in manufactured goods and sell between 50% 
and 70% of their exports within the Pacific Basin. For them the United 
States is by  far the largest market.  The other LDCs  are primarily 
exporters of natural resources and sell between 50% and 81% of their 209  Manufactured  Goods in the East and Southeast Asian Region 
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14.65  14.22 
11.45  4.68 
5.16  16.47 
21.11  10.13 
7.48  10.96 
2.67  37.70 
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8.56  28.15 
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6.40  13.00 














Sources: IMF, Direction of  Trade Statistics tapes; Ministry of Finance, Republic of China, 
Monthly Statistics of Exports and Imports, 20 August 1983. 
aExcludes New Zealand and Papua New Guinea. 
exports within the Pacific Basin. For them Japan is the largest market. 
Thus, the Pacific Basin provides a major market regardless of special- 
ization-manufactures  to the United States and raw materials to Japan. 
Another factor of importance has been the burgeoning trade among 
the LDCs within the Pacific Basin. Because five of the countries are 
institutionally linked to one another through ASEAN, intra-LDC trade 
has been given a boost. About 17% of the exports of ASEAN countries 
(including Singapore) are to other ASEAN countries, ranging from 7% 
for the Philippines to 27.5% for Malaysia. What is also noticeable is 
the importance of the ASEAN market for the non-ASEAN LDCs of 
the Pacific. For Hong  Kong,  11.5% of  its exports find a market in 
ASEAN. That makes ASEAN almost three times more important to 
Hong Kong than Japan. 
Thus, the answer to the question of why the LDCs of the Pacific 
Basin have had relatively good export success seems to be threefold; 
first, the countries in the Pacific Basin have grown faster than other 
countries; second, these LDCs have had more outward-oriented eco- 210  Lawrence B. Krause 
nomic policies than other LDCs; and third, they had a ready market 
for their exports in other Pacific Basin countries. 
8.3  Comparative Advantage in the Pacific Basin 
As noted earlier, the countries of  the Pacific Basin have sustained 
their economic growth better than countries in other regions. One of 
the reasons for this result is that countries in this region adjust better 
to shocks such as the two oil crises and the world recession. However, 
rapid adjustment also implies changing comparative advantages in in- 
ternational trade. Some empirical work was undertaken to summarize 
the nature of these changes. 
A four-factor model was developed for this purpose.  Goods were 
classified as either natural-resource-intensive, unskilled-labor-intensive, 
human-capital-intensive  (skilled-labor-ititensive), and  technology-labor- 
intensive. Physical capital was dropped as a classification because it 
is so internationally mobile as to provide little guidance to the location 
of production.’ A superior approach would be to measure the inputs 
of the various factors by product, but as the data were not available, 
an approximate method was employed. The results are shown in tables 
8.4-8.7  for twelve countries of the Pacific Basin grouped into developed 
countries, NICs, and ASEAN.2 
Table 8.4 shows the percentage  of  each country’s exports that is 
made up of natural-resource-intensive products. Seven of the twelve 
countries had more than half of their exports in this category. One other 
country, Canada, was just about at the 50% mark. This illustrates the 
obvious fact that natural resources are the basis for much of the trade 
of the Pacific Basin for most of the countries. In the case of Singapore, 
this results from its role as an entrepbt for natural resource production 
of neighboring countries and from its own position as a large refiner 
of petroleum. All of the other countries are producers and processors 
of raw materials, which constitute the mainstay of their export basket. 
It is also evident that there was a general tendency for natural resource 
goods to become slightly less important during the decade of the 1970s. 
The trend is most noticeable for Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thai- 
land-the  group of countries that are considered to be directly behind 
the NICs in moving into manufactured production and manufactures 
exports. The NICs themselves  also reduced  their  shares of  natural 
resource goods, with the declines for Korea and Singapore being the 
most sharp. 
Table 8.5 shows the trends during the 1970s of the share of labor- 
intensive goods in the exports of the Pacific Basin countries.  At the 
beginning of the decade, three-quarters of the exports of Hong Kong, 
over half of Korea’s exports, about one-quarter of  Japanese exports, Table 8.4  Exports of Natural-Resource-Intensive Commodities by Pacific Basin Countries (percentage of total) 
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98.68  98.57 
87.45  87.09 
88.40  86.82 









n.a.  n.a. 
n.a.  n.a. 
n.a.  n.a. 
n.a.  n.a. 
Source: UN Commodity Trade tapes. 
Note: Figures are rounded; n.a.  = not available. Table 8.5  Exports of Unskilled-Labor-Intensive  Commodities by Pacific Basin Countries (percentage of total) 
















1.47  1.29 
2.16  2.09 
24.08  22.94 
2.01  2.22 
5.76  5.88 
76.15  75.89 
52.82  54.53 
8.18  9.59 
0.18  0.16 
0.94  1.40 
1.39  1.52 
1.59  3.06 
1.31  2.11  1.64  1.25  1.06 
2.03  2.14  1.79  1.51  1.40 
21.85  21.51  18.73  18.95  18.60 
2.13  2.11  2.19  2.87  3.77 
5.95  5.29  5.40  5.25  5.66 
73.79  71.75  68.93  70.52  69.83 
50.10  47.64  45.12  49.49  51.71 
10.98  10.35  7.62  8.54  11.03 
0.18  0.16  0.14  0.10  0.12 
2.26  2.00  2.12  2.97  2.96 
2.48  3.99  3.46  5.83  8.85 





































2.11  1.87 
n.a.  n.a. 
n.a.  n.a. 
n.a.  n.a. 
n.a.  n.a. 
n.a.  n.a. 
n.a.  n.a. 
n.a.  n.a. 
n.a.  ma. 
n.a.  n.a. 
n.a.  n.a. 
n.a.  n.a. 
Source: UN Commodity Trade tapes. 
Note: Figures are rounded; n.a.  = not available. Table 8.6  Exports of  Human-Capital-Intensive Commodities by Pacific Basin Countries (percentage of  total) 















































6.09  6.34 
32.11  33.61 
48.62  48.57 
6.33  6.09 











6.31  6.37 
n.a.  n.a. 
n.a.  n.a. 
n.a.  n.a. 
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2.20  2.45 
1.30  1.61 









n.a.  n.a. 
n.a.  n.a. 
n.a.  n.a. 
n.a.  n.a. 
Source: UN Commodity Trade tapes. 
Note: Figures are rounded; n.a. = not available. Table 8.7  Exports of Technology-Intensive Commodities by  Pacific Basin Countries (percentage of total) 
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Source: UN Commodity Trade tapes. 
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8% of Singapore’s exports, and 6% of U.S. exports were labor-intensive 
goods. The exports of all of  the other countries were 2%  or less of 
those  goods.  During  the  1970s, the  share  of  labor-intensive goods 
dropped noticeably in Hong Kong and Korea, reaching 63% and 46% 
respectively, dropped  sharply in Japan to only  lo%, and remained 
unchanged in the United States. Singapore, New Zealand, and Malaysia 
had marginal increases in their shares. However, the Philippines and 
Thailand had significant increases. The rapid rise of wages in Japan, 
Hong Kong, and Korea no doubt explains why these countries became 
less competitive in exporting labor-intensive products. Wages also went 
up in the Philippines and Thailand but from a much lower base and by 
a lesser amount. These countries are at an earlier stage of development 
in which large gains in productivity are possible in labor-intensive prod- 
ucts, giving them a new comparative advantage. 
The measurement of the share of exports of human-capital-intensive 
products is shown in table 8.6. At the beginning of the 1970s, Japan 
had the largest share of its exports in human-capital-intensive products, 
followed by Canada and the United States. Several other countries had 
significant shares, especially  Hong Kong,  Singapore, and Australia. 
During the 1970s, Japan’s export share of human-capital goods rose to 
over 50%. An even larger rise was recorded in Korea and Hong Kong, 
which both reached 24% by 1979. Singapore’s exports of human-capital- 
intensive goods rose to 12%,  and New Zealand’s to 7%.  The other 
countries that had high shares at the start of the decade, such as Canada, 
the United States, and Australia, each experienced a small diminution. 
The ASEAN Four had only slight increases. Thus the main trend was 
an  increasing share in  countries  with  few natural  resources  and in 
moderate or advanced stages of industrialization (such as Japan and 
the NICs) and a slightly decreasing share in advanced industrial coun- 
tries that also have abundant natural resources. It should be noted that 
human-capital-intensive goods include some products such as steel and 
road motor vehicles which, under different models, would be consid- 
ered capital-intensive. Thus, the accumulation of capital in the NICs 
might provide a partial explanation for their increasing shares. 
Technology-intensive  commodities  are  covered  in  table  8.7. The 
United States has the largest share of its exports made up of technology- 
intensive goods. Japan was the second largest at the beginning of the 
decade, with one-quarter of  its exports technology-intensive goods, 
and its share rose to one-third by 1979. Canada had a rather high share 
of technology-intensive goods at the start of the decade (15%),  but it 
grew no further. Singapore started below Canada at ll%, but its share 
grew rapidly so that by  1979 almost one-quarter of its exports were 
technology-intensive goods.  Korea and Australia also increased their 
shares. The ASEAN Four had few technology-intensive exports at the 216  Lawrence B. Krause 
start of the decade; however, Malaysia and, to a lesser extent, the 
Philippines and Thailand all saw some growth. Comparative advantage 
in technology goods results from relatively large expenditures on re- 
search and development, which explains why the shares are so high in 
the United States and rising in Japan. However, technology can also 
be transferred  between  countries, usually as part of investments by 
multinational corporations (MNC). This explains much of the export 
success in these products by the developing countries of the Pacific 
Basin. Singapore is the most notable in this regard. It has welcomed 
foreign  investment  by  MNCs,  and in  recent  years the MNCs have 
promoted the transference of  technology  to Singapore,  resulting  in 
production  for  domestic  use  and  export  of  technology-intensive 
products. 
To summarize the story presented in tables 8.4-8.7,  natural resource 
commodity exports are very important for many countries of the Pacific 
Basin, but they have tended to decline as a share of total exports for 
most of them. Indonesia is the exception, and it remains almost totally 
a natural resource exporter.  Exports of labor-intensive commodities 
were very important for Japan and the NICs, but they have declined 
as a share of exports. Two ASEAN  countries, the Philippines  and 
Thailand, for the first time became significant exporters of labor-intensive 
goods during the  1970s. Japan and the NICs increased their export 
shares of  both human-capital-intensive and technology-intensive goods. 
The higher-income developed countries  (Australia, Canada, and the 
United States) had a slight decrease in shares of human-capital-intensive 
goods and increases in shares of technology-intensive goods. 
These tables map out some of the major shifts in comparative ad- 
vantage, but it is important not to exaggerate these changes into in- 
evitable stages. It is not necessarily true that, just because all countries 
start out as natural resource exporters, when they begin to industrialize, 
they  will export labor-intensive goods, develop further, and export 
human capital-intensive goods, and eventually become rich, do R&D, 
and export nothing but technology goods.3 Especially in the case of 
natural resources, the bases for some comparative advantages are per- 
manent or very long lasting, as seen in many Pacific Basin countries. 
Natural resources may set such a high reservation price for labor that 
a country might never specialize in labor-intensive commodities or do 
so only briefly. Futhermore, there is no obvious necessity for shifting 
from human-capital goods to technology-intensive goods. Neverthe- 
less, the patterns exhibited by the twelve Pacific Basin countries over 
the last decade in the factor content of their exports are broadly con- 
sistent with trends we would expect in fast-growing economies from 
traditional theory of comparative advantage. These patterns are strik- 
ingly  similar to those for the sixteen transitional economies  whose 217  Manufactured Goods in the East and Southeast Asian Region 
fifteen leading exports (based on United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development data) were examined by Bradford in chapter 7 of this 
volume. 
8.4  The Special Case of  Textiles and Clothing 
As already noted,  major shifts have occurred in export shares of 
labor-intensive products in the Pacific Basin, particularly for the de- 
veloping countries. Within the labor-intensive category, the most im- 
portant product group is textiles and clothing. Therefore it merits some 
special attention. As seen in table 8.2, fully 34% of Hong Kong’s ex- 
ports in 1980 were textiles and clothing; these items constituted 29% 
of Korea’s and 23% of Taiwan’s exports. In fact, it was the dominant 
product group for the NICs (other than Singapore). It also had become 
an important part of Thailand’s exports, reaching 9%. 
Textiles and clothing are very sensitive to cyclical factors, more so 
than, for example, certain new electronic products for which there is 
a widening of the market in addition to replacement demand. Thus, 
during the  1979-82  recession, Hong Kong’s export growth suffered 
from its heavy  dependency  on these goods. However,  the vigorous 
recovery that began in the United States at the end of 1982 displayed 
the positive effects of  cyclical  sensitivity.  In  1973, US. imports of 
textiles and clothing have risen rapidly, and the NICs have increased 
their exports to the United States. 
A second factor that distinguishes textiles and clothing trade is that 
it is among the most restricted  of any product group entering inter- 
national trade. The long history of multilateral restrictions going back 
to the temporary agreement on cotton textiles is now enshrined in the 
all-encompassing  Multi-Fiber Arrangement (MFA). Under pressures 
from the European Community, the last renewal of the MFA was even 
more restrictive and provided for little market growth. However, tex- 
tiles restraints often work in unexpected ways. For example, witness 
the contrast between the United States and Japan; the former is part 
of  the MFA and the latter is not. 
Few importing countries ever evaluate or make known to their con- 
sumers the economic costs of their restrictions on textiles and clothing. 
Australia, however, in an exception. Through the excellent work of 
the Australian Industries Assistance Commission (IAC), the amount 
of assistance to the industry is measured and published  (IAC 1983). 
Australia imposes high nominal tariff rates on textiles (25%) and cloth- 
ing (81%) and in addition imposes quantitative restrictions on imports. 
Thus, the effective rate of assistance for textiles is 54%, having risen 
from 43% in  1968-69,  and for clothing it is 213%, having risen from 
108% in the earlier years. By way of contrast, the average effective 218  Lawrence B. Krause 
rate of assistance to Australian manufacturing from 1968-69  to 1981- 
82 was reduced from 36% to 26%. Hence, textiles and clothing received 
above-average assistance in  1968-69,  which was sharply increased in 
contrast to other manufacturing industries. However, the results of this 
rise of protection are not exactly what one would expect. Unsurpris- 
ingly, exports as a share of Australian output, especially of clothing, 
were reduced as expected since protection generally reduces interna- 
tional competitiveness.  Significantly, however, employment in  these 
industries declined sharply and at a faster rate than in other manufac- 
turing industries. Furthermore, imports continued to rise, no doubt at 
a slower rate than would have been the case with less assistance. Thus, 
despite these policy efforts to thwart the workings of the market, com- 
parative advantage was still operative. 
In table 8.8 the trade in textiles and clothing for some countries in 
the Pacific Basin for 1973 and 1980-82  is shown. The misleading ap- 
pearance of protective schemes is evident in the contrast between the 
imports of the United States and Japan. By appearance, the United 
States by being a participant in the MFA is more restrictive than Japan. 
However,  the import statistics prove  that  the opposite is true.  The 
United States imported 2.2 times as much as Japan in  1973, that is, 
$3.8 billion versus $1.7 billi~n.~  By  1982, U.S. imports had grown to 
$1 1.6 billion and Japan’s to only $3.4 billion. In fact, US.  imports were 
3.4 times that of Japan, and this occurred before the economic recovery 
pushed U.S. imports even higher. 
The probable reason for this is that the U.S.  restraints do permit 
imports to grow and the quality of goods to be upgraded.  Japanese 
restraints may be both less visible and more restrictive.  Japan does 
impose some overt quotas on silk and silk products.  It also forces 
voluntary restraints on foreign producers of cotton thread. However, 
most of the restraints are exercised through MITI’s (Ministry of In- 
ternational Trade and Industry) reorganization of the industry. In 1973- 
74, in response to rapidly rising imports and the distress of the first oil 
crisis,  MITI designed  a reorganization of  the industry  primarily  by 
promoting vertical integration. Trading firms were urged to limit im- 
ports to promote the reorganization. This was particularly effective in 
clothing, since international trade in garments is initiated by the buyers 
and goods are produced to importers’ specifications.  If the Japanese 
will not initiate the purchase, there is no way to effectively export to 
them. Those imports that did increase are believed to be mainly from 
foreign joint ventures of Japanese firms. 
The MFA has several unfortunate quirks. Quotas apply only to de- 
veloping countries and Japan and are allocated by historical share of 
the market.  New entrants are permitted without restraint until they 
reach significant amounts, at which time they are brought under the Table 8.8  Trade in Textiles and Clothing in Some Pacific Basin Countries (in billions of U.S. $) 
Textiles  Clothing  Total 












0.04  0.13  0.14  n.a.  0.02  0.02  0.02 
0.15  0.31  0.33  0.29  0.12  0.21  0.23 
2.45  5.10  5.85  5.09  0.37  0.50  0.58 
0.03  0.10  0.10  n.a.  0.00  0.04  0.04 
1.22  3.62  3.61  2.77  0.29  1.22  1.26 
0.46  0.91  0.94  0.83  1.39  4.64  4.73 
0.44  2.20  2.45  n.a.  0.75  2.95  3.86 
0.14  0.37  0.34  0.34  0.13  0.43  0.47 
n.a.  0.06  0.15  0.16  n.a. 
0.21  0.27  0.52  0.56  0.50 
0.55  2.82  5.60  6.43  5.64 
n.a.  0.03  0.14  0.14  n.a. 
0.99  1.51  4.84  4.87  3.76 
5.01  1.85  5.55  5.95  5.56 
n.a.  1.19  5.15  6.31  n.a. 
0.46  0.27  0.80  0.81  0.80 
Imports 
Advanced 
Australiaa  0.62  1.10  1.15  ma.  0.11 
Canadaa  0.78  1.28  1.41  1.13  0.33 
Japan  1.13  1.65  1.63  1.60  0.57 
New Zealand  0.20  0.32  0.33  n.a.  0.01 
United States  1.58a  2.54  3.07  2.85  2.17" 
Hong Kong  0.94  2.97  3.43  2.97  0.12 
Korea  0.30  0.41  0.49  n.a.  0.01 
Singapore  0.42  0.85  0.88  0.88  0.04 
NICs 
Source: GATT 1983. 
Nore: n.a.  = not available. 
"Exports and imports f.0.b 
0.34  0.42  n.a. 
0.71  0.84  0.84 
1.53  1.80  1.83 
0.02  0.02  n.a. 
6.94  8.12  8.79 
0.69  0.93  1.06 
0.01  0.01  n.a. 
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quota. Thus, the quota encourages investment in new capacity in new 
countries which might not be competitive by a market test. Second, 
trade among developed countries may be artificially stimulated. For 
example,  the largest percentage  growth  of  imports into the United 
States in  1983 came from the European Community. Third, old sup- 
pliers with large historic shares are protected from the competition of 
new countries. Thus, Japan is unable to fill its quota in the United 
States but still exports more than it would by market test. Hence, it 
is not unusual for mature supplier countries to lobby for the continuance 
of a quota system5 
Table 8.8 also indicates a difference in the textile policies among the 
NICs. Hong Kong, which has a liberal trade regime, imports consid- 
erable amounts of textiles and exports even larger amounts of clothing. 
Korea, with a more restrictive import regime, imports very little textiles 
or clothing. 
8.5  Protectionism and Trade Patterns in the Pacific Basin 
Exports of manufactured goods by Pacific Basin countries continued 
to make progress in the 1970s and early 1980s despite the recession 
and rising protectionism. This was true even for textiles and clothing, 
the most  seriously constrained  group of  manufactures.  This should 
provide no grounds for complacency concerning protection. The fac- 
tors that have increased protection still exist. Secondly, exchange rates 
were for many years very far out of line with purchasing power values, 
with the U.S. dollar greatly overvalued and the Japanese yen greatly 
undervalued. Thirdly, a new round of trade negotiations may not pro- 
vide  enough  impetus  to liberalize  trade  to offset  the  drift  toward 
protectionism. 
World trade problems center around Japan. Japan is the second larg- 
est industrial country, and none of Japan’s trade partners are satisfied 
with their access to the Japanese market. Japan has benefited from 
four years of export-led growth during the worst recession in the post- 
war period. This, in effect, constitutes a beggar-thy-neighbor policy. 
Japanese exports have risen but imports have not.  No country can 
export without importing. Although Japan does import the raw mate- 
rials it needs, the problem lies in insufficient imports of manufactures 
and competitive agricultural commodities. Presumably, Japanese lead- 
ers believe  they  can manage  trade tensions  by  exercising selective 
voluntary export controls. Already more than half of Japan’s exports 
to Europe are under such controls. However, the rest of the world may 
not be willing to let Japan use voluntary controls, because they create 
windfalls for Japanese producers at the expense of foreign consumers. 221  Manufactured Goods in the East and Southeast Asian Region 
Somehow Japan’s imbalance with the rest of the world will be cor- 
rected. A possible way might be an exaggerated appreciation of the 
yen. A less desirable solution would be worldwide discrimination against 
Japan. From its own self-interest, one would think that Japan would 
overcome its inertia and propose a solution based on an increase in 
Japanese imports rather than trade contraction. 
Clearly the world needs a new round of negotiations to liberalize 
trade. In such a negotiation, the developing countries should be pre- 
pared  to be full and equal participants.  In the past, the developing 
countries have  appealed to their  status and have  asked for special 
treatment. The developed countries have treated them as special and, 
on average, worse than they treat each other; witness the MFA. The 
developing countries  should be willing to bargain away their special 
privileges such as preferences (Generalized System of Preferences) in 
return for ending their special penalties. Generalized liberalization of 
trade barriers by developing countries would also encourage more intra- 
LDC trade, which is already growing rapidly. 
Optimally, the negotiations should be global in scope. However, in 
the event that Europe and/or Latin America are unwilling to take part, 
then a second-best solution might well be a regional freeing of trade 
within the Pacific Basin. 
Appendix 
Commodity ClassiJcation System 
International trade in commodities is classified by the United Nations 
into ten broad groKps, labeled by the numbers 0 to 9 (standard inter- 
national  trade classification, or SITC). The categories, when finally 
disaggregated, number approximately 1,300  basic items, each of which 
is identified by a four-digit-or,  in some cases, a five-digit-code. These 
basic items, when summed, compose total commodity trade for a given 
reporting country and partner country.6 
To create a manageable data bank, the UN trade data were initially 
aggregated into 106 commodity groups, which taken together represent 
total trade. For the purposes of this study, the category “goods, not 
elsewhere specified”  (SITC 9, less 951) was then excluded because it 
is composed of goods without any common traits. 
The 105 commodities were classified into four groups according to 
their  relative  factor intensities.  These groups  are natural-resource- 222  Lawrence B. Krause 
intensive, unskilled-labor-intensive, technology-intensive, and human- 
capital-intensive goods (table 8.A. 1). 
The commodity classification procedure was performed sequentially 
by initially categorizing the commodities whose factor intensities are 
most apparent. First, the natural-resource-based goods were identified. 
This group consists of all commodities within SITC sections 0-4  (that 
is, food and  live animals, beverages  and tobacco,  crude materials, 
mineral fuels,  and  animal  and  vegetable  oils) and  SITC classes 61 
(leather), 63 (plywood), 68 (nonferrous metals), 661 -63  (mineral man- 
ufactures), and 667 (diamonds). There were forty-two commodities in 
this group. 
Second, by using the groupings of commodities according to their 
respective value added per worker, as presented by Garnaut and An- 
derson (1980, 141),’  eleven goods were classified as unskilled-labor- 
intensive. These commodities, representing those with the lowest value 
added per worker, are the same goods appearing in Garnaut and An- 
derson, except where the commodity aggregations precluded separating 
goods further.  Included  in  this group are such  SITC classes as 65 
(textiles and fabrics), 664-66  (glass), 735 (ships and boats), 81-85, 
893-95,899  (miscellaneous consumer goods, furniture, clothing, foot- 
wear, and toys), and 951 (firearms). 
The remaining commodities were divided into technology-intensive 
and  human-capital-intensive  categories  by  selecting  as technology- 
intensive those goods with the highest ratios of research and devel- 
opment expenditures to value added.* Ratios were calculated by in- 
dustry, classified according to two- and three-digit standard industrial 
classifications (SIC), for the average of the years 1967-68  and 1975- 
76. The SIC classes were then cross-classified by using Balassa’s sys- 
tem correlating SIC and SITC (1977, Appendix table 2). There are thirty 
commodities in the technology-intensive category, including SITC di- 
visions 51 (chemical elements), 54 (medicine), 56 (fertilizer), 58 (plas- 
tics), 52, 57, 59 (other chemicals), 71 less 7199 (machinery), 7249 (te- 
lecommunications equipment), 726 (electrical apparatus, not elsewhere 
specified), 734 (aircraft), 861 (scientific, medical, and optical measuring 
apparatus), and 862-63  (photographic supplies). 
Human-capital-intensive goods are those that have relatively lower 
ratios of  research and development expenditures to value added than 
technology-intensive goods. Among the twenty-two commodities fall- 
ing under the human-capital-intensive rubric are SITC groups 53 (paints), 
55 (perfumes), 62 (rubber), 64  (paper), 672-79  (steel), 69 (manufactures 
of metal, not elsewhere specified), 7199 (machine parts), 7241 (televi- 
sions), 7242 (radios), 725 (domestic electrical apparatus), 7294 (auto- 
motive electrical equipment), 73  1 (trains), 733 (trailers), 864 (watches), 
891 (phonographs), 892 (books), and 896-97  (jewelry). 223  Manufactured  Goods in the East and Southeast Asian Region 
Table 8.A.1  SITC Designations for Products in  International Trade 
Commodity  SITC, Rev. 
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Diamonds  667 
Pig iron  67  1 
Unwrought 
nonferrous 





copper  682 1 
manufactures  6822 




aluminum  6841 
manufactures  6842 



























elements  51 
Medicine  54 
Fertilizer  56 
Plastics  58 
Other chemicals  52, 57, 59 
Power-generating 
equipment  7111-13,  7116- 
18 
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Table 8.A.1  (continued) 

















































7296-97.  7299 
Scientific 
Optical equipment 
equipment  8617-19 
861 1-13 
Commodity  SITC, Rev. 
Aircraft  134 
Cameras  8614-16 
Film 
(photographic 
supplies)  862 -63 



































724  1 
7242 
725 
73  I 
7321 
7322-25 







Source: SITC numbers from United Nations 1961. This classification scheme was in 
effect from 1960 to 1975. 
Notes 
1.  The classification method is described in the Appendix. 
2.  The exclusion of Taiwan from the United Nations commodity trade tapes 
prevents the extension of the analysis to that country. 
3.  However, technology  goods are rising  as a share of world  trade, and 
therefore, the share of  technology goods in the exports of all countries could 
increase. 225  Manufactured  Goods in the East and Southeast Asian Region 
4.  Since the U.S. figure is f.0.b.  and Japan’s is c.i.f., the contrast would be 
greater if comparably measured. 
5. In the case of  U.S.  quotas on stainless steel flatwear,  only Japanese 
producers wanted them continued, but the quota was ended. 
6. A detailed listing of the classification system used in this study is presented 
in United Nations  1961. 
7. The presentation in Garnaut and Anderson is based on the work of Bela 
Balassa (1977, Appendix table 1). 
8.  Research and development figures  were  taken from National  Science 
Foundation 1980; value added figures were from Bureau of the Census, Annual 
Survey of  Manufactures, various years. 
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